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FROM THE STOCKS, TO HANDCUFFS, TO HOLLYWOOD: AN ANALYSIS
OF PUBLIC HUMILIATION IN JUDGE JUDY’S SYNDI-COURT
Martin McKown*
A plaintiff stands as the bailiff swears him in. The judge takes
one look at the plaintiff, who is wearing a pair of casual jeans, and
asks, “Who taught you to dress like that for court?”1 The plaintiff
swallows a lump in his throat as humiliating silence ensues. But the
silence does not last long. Enraged by the plaintiff’s lackadaisical
appearance, the judge proceeds to chastise the plaintiff for his
obvious indiscretion. After minutes of aggressive censuring, the man
attempts to offer an excuse by interrupting the judge. The judge’s
reply is sharp: “I’M SPEAKING!” The plaintiff stops mid-syllable.
The judge declares, “This isn’t American Idol sir, this is a court!”2
The mass laughter that follows reminds the plaintiff that he being
recorded in front of a live studio audience, and that the proceeding
will be broadcast to millions of at-home viewers. The plaintiff feels
embarrassment churn in the pit of his stomach. In this moment, the
plaintiff is questioning his decision to appear on syndi-court.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The term “syndi-court” refers to televised court shows such
as Judge Judy, The People’s Court, and Judge Joe Brown.3 The
phrase was coined because the television rights to these shows are

*
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member of the Duquesne Law Review, and former congressional staffer. He would
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1
This hypothetical scenario was created by the author for illustrative purposes.
The quotes included in the scenario are similar to those of actual syndi-court
judges.
2
American
Idol,
WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=American_Idol&oldid=632705456 (last
visited Nov. 8, 2014). American Idol is an American singing competition television
series that employs a panel of judges who critique the contestants’ performances.
3
See Philip Z. Kimball, Syndi-Court Justice: Judge Judy and Exploitation of
Arbitration, 4 J. AM. ARB. 145, 145-47 (2005), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/dispute/essay/syndicourtj
ustice.authcheckdam.pdf.
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bought on the syndication market.4 Syndi-courts feature actual
litigants seeking to resolve legitimate disputes.5 While syndi-courts
portray themselves as courts created by the state, they are actually
arbitration proceedings.6 These arbitration-based reality shows
recently gained popularity across the country due to the personalities
of their judges.7 For example, Judge Judith Sheindlin, the presiding
judge on Judge Judy, is famous for her quick wit and humor on the
bench, which is similar to that offered by the judge in the hypothetical
scenario above.8 Often, her witty and humorous remarks, known as
“judyisms,” humiliate or embarrass the individuals to which they are
directed.9
While orations by Judge Judy may embarrass or humiliate
litigants, her comments also offer true life lessons and advice (e.g.,
parties should dress appropriately to court).10 But is this harsh advice
directed precisely to those individuals or, rather, society-at-large?11
This article explores the origin, use, and effect of public humiliation
in Judge Judy’s syndi-court.12 First, this article explores the role of
public humiliation in America’s legal system since the colonial era

Id. “Syndication is the practice of selling rights to present television programs,
generally to local television stations or cable channels. Most shows on television
are from the syndication market. The exceptions to this are generally current
network prime-time programs, live news programs and live coverage of sports and
other special events.” Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Kimball, supra note 3.
8
Id. She is generally known by the name “Judge Judy.” Id.
9
Judge
Judy,
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Judge_Judy&oldid=632565536
(last
visited Nov. 9, 2014). For example, Judge Judy frequently makes statements like:
“If you live to be 100, you will never be as smart as I am, sir,” “Clearly you are not
wrapped too tight,” “Where did you think you were coming to today, a tea party,”
and “Do I look like I need help from you?” Id.
10
Id. Examples of these statements include: “A good deed never goes
unpunished,” “Beauty fades, dumb is forever,” “If it doesn’t make sense, it’s not
true,” and “Do you know when teenagers are lying? When their mouths move.” Id.
11
See infra Part III.
12
See infra Parts II-III.
4
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and identifies key issues surround “shaming sanctions.”13 Next, this
article links the traditions and customs of public humiliation in
America to pluralistic adjudication in Judge Judy’s syndi-court.14
Further, this article suggests that Judge Judy employs public
humiliation to address the moral collapse of our society, rather than
the distinct indiscretions of individual litigants.15 Finally, this article
concludes that American legal scholars should embrace syndi-courts
for serving as visible public platforms that promote personal
accountability.16
II.BACKGROUND
A.Public Humiliation in Colonial America
The American legal system has long incorporated public
humiliation as normative punishment in criminal contexts.17
Applying British law, seventeenth century colonial magistrates used
shaming sanctions in many ways.18 These magistrates often ordered
criminal offenders to confess their guilt and express their remorse in

See infra Part II. This article uses the terms “public humiliation” and “shaming
sanctions” interchangeably. Shaming sanctions are usually criminal penalties that
incorporate methods of conventional public humiliation.
14
See infra Part III.
15
Id.
16
See infra Part IV. Many scholars criticize syndi-court shows and judges for
arguably distorting the American public’s perception of the justice system. See,
e.g., Kimberlianne Podlas, Blame Judge Judy: The Effects of Syndicated Television
Courtrooms on Jurors, 25 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 557, 557-58 (2002). However,
there is little literature with respect to the positive implications of syndi-court
shows.
17
James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE
L.J. 1055, 1089 (1998).
18
Matthew W. Meskell, The History of Prisons in the United States from 1777 to
1877, 51 STAN. L. REV. 839, 842 (1999). As a customary form of punishment,
shaming sanctions in colonial America were firmly rooted in British penal
ideology. Id. Indeed, colonial magistrates commonly applied British penal statutes
verbatim. Id. During the eighteenth century, Britain’s penal code defined at least
160 capital offenses within colonial America. Id.
13
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the town square.19 Other offenders were forced to sit in the stocks as
bystanders sneered and snickered.20 Sometimes, offenders confined
to the stocks were also forced to wear dough, cabbage, or other items
on their heads.21 To heighten the mortification, onlookers would
throw stale eggs at the offenders.22 More severe forms of punishment
involved branding and maiming.23 All of these punishments were
widely viewed by the public because, to maximize the humiliation,
local officials implemented the penalties in bustling areas.24
Into the eighteenth century and following the American
Revolutionary War, public humiliation continued being enshrined
into American culture.25 Although British penal ideology fell out of
favor following American independence, religious clerics publicly
lectured criminals in an effort to reform their character by prompting
remorse.26 In some cases, the offender had to beg their congregation
for forgiveness following formal admonition from church officials.27
These practices influenced penal philosophy in early America
because many communities were founded upon common religious
19

Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L.
REV. 1880, 1888 (1991).
20
James A. Cox, Bilboes, Brands, and Branks: Colonial Crimes and Punishments,
COLONIAL
WILLIAMSBURG
FOUND.,
http://www.history.org/Foundation/journal/spring03/branks.cfm (last visited Sept.
29, 2014).
21
Massaro, supra note 19, at 1914.
22
Id.
23
Jon A. Brilliant, The Modern Day Scarlet Letter: A Critical Analysis of Modern
Probation Conditions, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1357, 1361 (1989).
24
Rosalind K. Kelley, Sentenced to Wear the Scarlet Letter: Judicial Innovations
in Sentencing—Are They Constitutional?, 93 DICK. L. REV. 759, 772 (1989).
25
Meskell, supra note 18, at 843 (noting Americans’ “aversion to the harshness
of the English criminal code” following the American Revolutionary War);
Barbara Clare Morton, Bringing Skeletons out of the Closet and into the Light—
”Scarlet Letter” Sentencing Can Meet the Goals of Probation in Modern America
Because It Deprives Offenders of Privacy, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 97, 116 (2001)
(discussing “modern implementation of shame sanctions”).
26
Morton, supra note 25, at 102.
27
See Scott E. Sanders, Scarlet Letters, Bilboes and Cable TV: Are Shame
Punishments Cruel and Outdated or Are They A Viable Option for American
Jurisprudence?, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 359, 363 (1998).
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beliefs.28 The religious homogeny and social intimacy of earlyAmerican communities rendered shaming sanctions particularly
effective because most offenders feared the disgrace of public
admonishment.29 Thus, most communities punished offenders with
shaming sanctions, rather than simple imprisonment.30
However, during the nineteenth century, judges increasingly
punished offenders with imprisonment because the small intimate
communities that previously existed in colonial America had evolved
into anonymous modern populates.31 By diluting the fear associated
with public humiliation, the newfound anonymity in urban America
caused the effect of shaming sanctions to fade.32 As crime rates began
to rise, judges preferred long term prison sentences over other forms
of punishment like shaming.33
B.Public Humiliation in America Today
Into the twentieth century, the newfound right to privacy—
now a fading social norm—enticed contemporary jurists to
reevaluate the legality of public humiliation as punishment for
criminal offenses.34 Despite the elaboration of the right to privacy,
courts consistently sustain shaming sanctions in light of
constitutional principles.35 For example, in Florida, an appellate
court stated “[t]he mere requirement that a defendant display a
‘scarlet letter’ as part of his punishment is not necessarily offensive

28

Major W. Renn Gade, Crime and Punishment in American History, 146 MIL.
L. REV. 297, 298 (1994).
29
Massaro, supra note 19, at 1912. Influenced by Judeo-Christian principles,
communities expected offenders to both seek forgiveness and repent. Id. at 191213.
30
Gade, supra note 28, at 298.
31
Morton, supra note 25, at 105.
32
Id. at 106.
33
Id. at 107.
34
Id. at 116-17. The twentieth century marked the recognition and expansion of
the constitutional right to privacy. Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy,
1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1336 (1992).
35
See, e.g., Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
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to the Constitution.”36 In fact, courts acknowledge that the scope of
discretion given to sentencing judges is breathtakingly broad.37
Furthermore, the American legal community has not voiced
any significant objection to shaming sanctions.38 Many legal scholars
agree that shaming sanctions are a constitutional and effective
alternative to imprisonment.39 The United States Supreme Court also
agrees.40 In Paul v. Davis, the police circulated a flyer including the
names and photographs of shoplifters.41 There, the Supreme Court
imposed a barrier to constitutional challenges of shaming sanctions.42
Writing for the majority, then-Associate Justice William Rehnquist
stated “that the interest in reputation asserted in this case is neither
‘liberty’ nor ‘property’ guaranteed against state deprivation without
due process of law.”43
After Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
(“the Act”), shaming sanctions became a tool for supervised
release.44 Through the Act, Congress directed the newly-created
United States Sentencing Commission to develop guidelines for
courts sentencing federal offenders.45 Congress passed the Act to
increase consistency among sentencing policies for the federal

36

Id. at 125.
See, e.g., Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1971). But see State v.
Burdin, 924 S.W.2d 82, 87 (Tenn. 1996) (noting that courts may not “impose
punishments which are beyond the bounds of traditional notions of rehabilitation”).
38
Whitman, supra note 17, at 1057. Still, some legal scholars examine the
constitutionality of shaming sanctions with skepticism. See, e.g., Massaro, supra
note 19, at 1944 (noting “[o]ne of the principal constitutional objections is based
on the eighth amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment”).
39
See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 591, 594 (1996) (“Shaming penalties unambiguously express condemnation
and are a feasible alternative to imprisonment for many offenses”).
40
See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
41
Id. at 694-97.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 712.
44
See generally Preston H. Neel, Punishment or Not: The Effect of United States
v. Gementera’s Shame Condition on the Ever-Changing Concept of Supervised
Release Conditions, 31 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 153, 153-54 (2007).
45
18 U.S.C. §§ 3551 et seq. (2012).
37

V. 36.2 FROM STOCKS, TO HANDCUFFS, TO HOLLYWOOD

7

criminal justice system.46 The Act also created a supervised release
system to help imprisoned offenders reintegrate into their
communities through rehabilitative means.47 Accordingly, some
sentencing judges impose shaming sanctions as part of supervised
release conditions to promote social reintegration of offenders.48
However, subsequent changes to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines call into question the legality of shaming sanctions for
purposes of supervised release.49 According to a congressional report
concerning those amendments, Congress created the supervise
release system “to ease the defendant’s transition into the community
after the service of a long prison term for a particularly serious
offense, or to provide rehabilitation to a defendant who has spent a
fairly short period in prison for punishment.”50 Thus, while
supervised release conditions should help rehabilitate or reintegrate
an offender, supervised release conditions might not be a means of
reprimand or retribution.51 Although the Supreme Court has upheld
shaming sanctions in other contexts, the court has never addressed
the lawfulness of shaming sanctions for purposes of supervised
release under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.52
C.A Survey of Modern Case Law: Public Humiliation in
Official Courts
Despite a lack of precedential guidance from the Supreme
Court, a handful of intermediate appellate courts disfavor shaming

46

28 U.S.C. § 991 (2012).
S. REP. NO. 98-225 (1983).
48
See Note, Shame, Stigma, and Crime: Evaluating the Efficacy of Shaming
Sanctions in Criminal Law, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2186, 2192-93 (2003).
49
S. REP. NO. 98-225 (1984).
50
Id. Notably, the section of the law authorizing judges to impose supervised
released conditions is entirely devoid of the term “punishment.” 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a). The chief purpose of the law is rehabilitation. Id.
51
S. REP. NO. 98-225 (1984).
52
Compare Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) with Gementera v. United States,
546 U.S. 1031 (2005) (denying certiorari where a convicted mail thief challenged
a supervised release condition requiring the thief to wear a signboard stating, “I
stole mail. This is my punishment”).
47
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sanctions as conditions of supervised release.53 In Illinois, for
instance, an appellate court vacated a punishment in People v.
Johnson that required an offender to, as a condition of supervised
release, publish an apology containing her mug shot in a local
newspaper.54 The Johnson court recognized “the trial judge may be
attempting to put more bite, or punishment, in the supervision
process.”55 However, in considering the potential emotional and
mental consequences of the publication requirement, the Johnson
court determined that any psychological damage likely caused by the
publication was inconsistent with rehabilitative goals.56 Thus, the
court invalidated the publication requirement.57
In a similar case, People v. Hackler, the California Court of
Appeals vacated a supervised release condition requiring a defendant
to wear a shirt broadcasting his status as a felony thief.58 Referencing
Nathaniel Hawthorne’s Scarlet Letter, the trial court in that case
branded the offender as a modern day “Hester Prin [sic],” and
characterized the sanction as “going back to some extent to the era of
stocks.”59 Ultimately, the appellate court reasoned that shaming
sanctions expose offenders to public ridicule and humiliation, rather
than facilitate rehabilitation.60 Accordingly, the Hackler court struck
down the shaming sanction in that case.61
Two years after the Hackler decision, the New York Court of
Appeals agreed in People v. Letterlough that shaming sanctions do
not reasonably relate to rehabilitation.62 In that case, the court
evaluated a condition requiring a drunk driver to place a florescent
53

See, e.g., United States v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2004); People v.
Letterlough, 655 N.E.2d 146 (N.Y. 1995); People v. Hackler, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 681
(Cal. App. 5th Dist. 1993); People v. Johnson, 528 N.E.2d 1360 (Ill. App. Ct.
1988).
54
People v. Johnson, 528 N.E.2d 1360, 1362 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
People v. Hackler, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 681, 682 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. 1993).
59
Id. at 686.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 682.
62
People v. Letterlough, 655 N.E.2d 146, 150 (N.Y. 1995).
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sign on his vehicle stating “CONVICTED DWI.”63 The Letterlough court
reasoned that “public disclosure of a person’s crime, and the
attendant humiliation and public disgrace, has historically been
regarded strictly as a form of punishment.”64 Hence, the Letterlough
court ruled the sanction was unrelated to rehabilitation and, therefore,
impermissible as a supervised release condition.65
More recently, however, in United States v. Gementera, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a
supervised release condition requiring a mail thief to stand in front
of a local post office wearing a sign stating he stole mail.66 The
Gementera court agreed with the trial court’s “reasoning that
rehabilitation would better be served by means other than extended
incarceration and punishment is plainly reasonable.”67 The court also
explained that the offender failed to prove the condition violated
contemporary standards of decency under the Eighth Amendment of
the United States Constitution.68 At bottom, the Gementera court
upheld the supervised release condition because, unlike the Hackler
and Letterlough courts, the Gementera court found the condition to
be reasonably related to the objective of rehabilitation.69 In a glaring
dissent, however, Judge Michael Daly Hawkins argued “[t]o affirm
the imposition of such punishments recalls a time in our history when
pillories and stocks were the order of the day.”70
III. ANALYSIS
A. Distinguishing the Purposes and Effects of Public
Humiliation
63

Id. at 147.
Id. at 149.
65
Id. at 150.
66
United States v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 2004).
67
Id. at 607.
68
Id. at. 608.
69
Id. at 607.
70
Id. at 612 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). Despite this debate, sentencing judges
regularly impose shaming sanctions in the context of first-offender petty crimes.
Neel, supra note 44, at 173.
64
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The purposes of public humiliation in official courts are
twofold.71 First, shaming sanctions offer offenders opportunities to
rehabilitate themselves without institutional confinement, which is
often costly and reserved for society’s most serious offenders.72
Second, shaming sanctions are often punitive.73 Despite this
theoretical distinction, courts struggle to draw lines between
rehabilitative and punitive shaming sanctions.74 The Letterlough
court observed the “inherent overlap and the difficulty in drawing
lines between rehabilitative and punitive or deterrent sanctions.”75
Courts also struggle to assess the psychological effect of
shaming sanctions on individuals.76 The Johnson court
acknowledged that “[h]olding an offender up to ridicule has an
impact upon the offender that does not have the disadvantages of

71

Letterlough, 655 N.E.2d at 149. Note that official courts are non-arbitration
courts created by state or federal law, such as federal district courts.
72
Id. As the Letterlough court explained, “[t]he utility of rehabilitation as a
vehicle for preventing criminal behavior ‘rests upon the belief that human behavior
is the product of antecedent causes, that these causes can be identified, and that on
this basis therapeutic measures can be employed to effect changes in the behavior
of the person treated.’” Id. at 148 (quoting LaFave and Scott, Substantive Criminal
Law § 1.5, at 33).
73
Id. at 149. Generally, “‘[w]hen one shames another person, the goal is to
degrade the object of shame, to place him lower in the chain of being, to
dehumanize him.’” Gementera, 379 F.3d at 612 (quoting Dan Markel, Are
Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism and the Implications
for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157, 2179 (2001)).
74
See Letterlough, 655 N.E.2d at 153 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). In the opinion of
one judge, “[t]he sentencing environment does not abide a theoretical purity that
would cabin ‘punishment’ and ‘rehabilitation’ into such discrete, mutually
exclusive universes.” Id.
75
Id. at 149. Peripheral purposes also exist, such as to protect the public through
warning. Id. at 147. In Letterlough, when the trial court required a drunk driver to
bear the sign “CONVICTED DWI” on his license plate, the judge said, “This
gentleman is 54 years of age and I do not wish to be the one that opens a newspaper
and sees that this gentleman has caused an accident that has taken an innocent
person’s life because I did not do something that either warns the public or treated
his problem. I hope to be doing both.” Id.
76
See People v. Johnson, 528 N.E.2d 1360, 1362 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
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imprisonment nor the financial detriment to the offender or the
offender’s family of a substantial fine,” and that, in certain cases,
shaming sanctions “might be quite rehabilitative and instructive,
particularly to people who do not have general criminal tendencies
and who would be embarrassed by the publicity.”77 Nonetheless, the
Johnson majority also acknowledged that, without professional
assistance, courts cannot definitively predict the psychological or
psychiatric effect of shaming sanctions.78
In reviewing shaming sanctions, courts and legal scholars
likewise consider the psychological effects of these sanctions on the
public.79 Indeed, even the Gementera court alluded to the overall
effects of shaming sanctions on society-at-large.80 In the context of
syndi-courts, these composite controversies raise an important
question: what effects does public humiliation in Judge Judy’s syndicourt have on individual litigants and society-at-large?81
B. Through the Lens of Legal Pluralism, Syndi-courts Are
Legitimate Rule Setters and Decision Makers
Before proceeding with further analysis, it is important to
delineate the inherent legitimacy of syndi-courts. Without a
formalistic notion of legitimacy intrinsic to official courts established
by the state, syndi-courts do not have teeth; syndi-court rulings
would be neither binding nor final. Syndi-courts maintain their
legitimacy through the theory of legal pluralism.
Legal pluralism “is generally defined as a situation in which
two or more legal systems coexist in the same social field.”82 In
essence, legal pluralism extends the rule of law beyond official forms
of law to include unofficial notions of law, such as custom and

77

Id. at 1363 (Green, J., concurring).
Id. at 1362.
79
See United States v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 605 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing
Kahan, supra note 39).
80
Id.
81
See infra Parts IIIC-D.
82
Sally E. Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869, 870 (1988).
78
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tradition.83 Since the conception of this theory, legal scholars mostly
apply legal pluralism to the study of post-colonial societies in
Africa.84 In the early twentieth century, social scientists examined the
legal order of indigenous peoples among these colonized societies.85
While those indigenous peoples were subject to European law
practiced by colonists, the indigenous peoples subtly maintained a
rich variety of customary law in nondominant legal regimes.86
The parallel arrangement between these dominant and
nondominant systems occasionally offered individuals an
opportunity for forum shopping.87 For example, in a family support
dispute, a party seeking to avoid paying alimony might have
preferred to litigate in an official court because English common law
did not obligate individuals to offer family support.88 The other party,
however, might have sought to resolve the dispute in a customary
legal regime because, as a matter of custom, family support was
prerequisite to custody and marital rights.89 Therefore, despite the
existence of dominant, official court systems in post-colonial Africa,
some parties sought to resolve their disputes in nondominant,
unofficial systems.90
Syndi-courts create similar opportunities for forum shopping
because many litigants prefer to appear in syndi-court in lieu of
pursuing formal litigation.91 Particularly, syndi-court forums offer
stark advantages to defendants:
A defendant who thinks he or she has a bad case has a great
incentive to appear on the show, since the appearance itself absolves
83

Richard Nobles & David Schiff, Using Systems Theory to Study Legal
Pluralism: What Could Be Gained?, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 265, 265 (2012).
84
Merry, supra note 82, at 869.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
See generally Savitri Goonesekere, Family Support and Maintenance:
Emerging Issues in Some Developing Countries with Mixed Jurisdictions, 44 FAM.
CT. REV. 361 (2006) (exploring the existence of plural legal traditions that enable
manipulation of jurisdiction for personal advantage).
88
Id.
89
Id. at 362.
90
Id.
91
See Kimball, supra note 3.
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any personal liability. Alternatively, if the defendant has a very good
defense, they can earn an appearance fee for a few minutes of on air
berating by someone like Judge Judy.92
But, for both plaintiffs and defendants, syndi-court is cheaper
than formal litigation because the expenses of the parties are
generally paid for by the producers of each show.93 Additionally,
judgments against syndi-court litigants are not reported as small
claims judgments to credit bureaus.94 Finally, syndi-court offers
litigants the flexibility of arbitration, which is typically faster than
traditional litigation because syndi-courts need not adhere to
complex rules of procedure or evidence, and need not obey rigid
calendars enforced by formal courts.95 Thus, litigants may seek to
resolve their disputes in the unofficial syndi-court system, instead of
the official state-created court system.96
However, unlike the dominant legal system of many postcolonial African countries, which were established after their
corollary customary legal regimes, the official court system in the
United States predates the syndi-court system. Ironically, this
chronologically inverse pluralistic relationship gives syndi-courts
their binding authority. Without an official system that recognizes
arbitration law, the judgments in arbitration-based reality court
shows would be frail. After all, while the methods used by syndicourt judges are rooted in age-old tradition or custom, the creation of
syndi-court as a vehicle for dispute resolution is not.97
The relationship between official courts in the United States
and syndi-courts is more analogous to that of state-recognized
customary courts and other official courts in African countries
today.98 Malawi, for example, enacted ordinances identifying courts
92

Id.
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
See supra Part II.
98
See generally Megan Crouch, Improving Legal Access for Rural Malawi
Villagers,
JURIST,
(Aug.
18,
2011,
2:00
PM),
http://jurist.org/dateline/2011/08/megan-crouch-local-courts-malawi.php. After
93

14

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW & POLICY

V.36.2

having authority to hear disputes under customary or traditional law,
which would not have been enforced otherwise.99 Overall, within a
framework of governance, dominant, official court systems that
incorporate nondominant, unofficial court systems strengthen the
authority base of those otherwise unofficial legal regimes, whether
they be customary regimes or syndi-courts.
C. Public Humiliation by Judge Judy Has Little Effect on
Individual Litigants
The effects of Judge Judy’s tough adjudicating approach
illustrates the dichotomy of modern privacy values and colonial-style
public humiliation.100 In colonial America, shaming sanctions
effectively deterred wrongdoing by exploiting a shared sense of
disgust against criminal offenders in tightknit communities.101 In
modern America, shaming sanctions should be equally effective
because they deprive offenders of privacy.102 However, many Judge
Judy litigants, plaintiffs and defendants alike, “are just looking for
their fifteen minutes of fame.”103 Thus, Judge Judy’s hard-hitting
style does not affect individual litigants in the same way that shaming
sanctions influence criminal offenders.104
Nevertheless, Judge Judy’s practices undoubtedly emanate
from colonial customs and traditions.105 Through rhetoric, Judge
Judy commonly berates litigants for inappropriate behavior or sloppy

the country gained independence in 1964, the Malawian legal system consisted of
both conventional courts and traditional courts. Id.
99
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conduct.106 As her cases unfold, Judge Judy often makes statements
such as: “[Y]ou ought to be ashamed of yourself!” or “Do you feel
as if you’re getting whipped? You sure are!”107 These statements, in
particular, spring from colonial activities and ideas, such as when
wrongful parties were sentenced to public whippings.108 Judge
Judy’s verbal statements also connote her principal understanding of
the effects of humiliating experiences on litigants.109
Alone, Judge Judy’s hard-hitting words are not intended to
cause all the embarrassment for the parties.110 Her remarks sting so
much because they are made in front of a live audience and millions
of at-home viewers.111 The audience often laughs at litigants forced
to describe or explain lucrative acts.112 Further, the audience
regularly applauds Judge Judy for delivering demeaning remarks that
indirectly label hostile litigants as enemies.113 As one commentator
noted, “implied cues, combined with Judge Judy’s affectively
charged delivery, allow the audience to rehearse public moral
posturing along with her.”114 Like colonial era jurists, Judge Judy
knows all too well the desired effect of embarrassment on
antagonistic parties in front of an audience.115 Actually, in chastising
106
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one individual, she stated: “Consider yourself having been
reasonably humiliated in front of ten million people. Now, without
saying another word, turn around, and find the exit. Goodbye.”116
But because Judge Judy’s “no nonsense” temperament is so
widely known, most litigants that appear on the show have some
forewarning of the possible embarrassment to which she may subject
them to.117 Accordingly, some individuals who appear on the show
are desperately seeking attention, or hope that their brief television
appearance will miraculously propel them into fame and fortune.118
Others appear on the show for material incentives.119 For example,
litigants receive an appearance fee of at least $100 and, in essence,
an all-expense-paid vacation to Hollywood, California, where the
show is filmed.120 Whatever their motives may be, the benefits for
litigants who attend the show outweigh the verbal lashings that Judge
Judy may deliver.121 Litigants who appear on Judge Judy contravene
the basic tenets of colonial era probationers, who considered the loss
of privacy a large price to pay.122
Overall, in a society that values privacy, individuals generally
comport to avoid widespread public embarrassment.123 Yet, Judge
Judy litigants voluntarily subject themselves to verbal reprimands in
front of millions of viewers.124 Prior to filming the show, the litigants
know what to expect—a few flippant words from a television
personality dressed in a black robe.125 With this anticipation, Judge
Judy’s exacting words lose their “bite.”126 For that reason, the
embarrassment experienced by litigants appearing before Judge Judy
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does not parallel the discomfiture traditionally experienced by
colonial era offenders.127
D. Judge Judy Uses Public Humiliation in Syndi-court to
Address Big Picture Societal Transgressions
While the embarrassment caused by Judge Judy may not have
long term effects on individual litigants, this ostensible mortification
does have an emotional impact on society-at-large.128 Perceivably,
modern society has experienced a collapsing of traditional values and
moral substance since the early twentieth century. 129 Judge Judy’s
actions, rulings, and words in her show are pointed to address this
moral decay.130 The genesis of her goal harkens back to her
experience as a family court judge.131 Through each case, Judge Judy
uses her televised forum to address the moral carelessness of societyat-large, just as colonial era magistrates did when they used the town
square to punish morally decrepit offenders in early America.132
The idea that America is experiencing as moral decline is
shared among many factions.133 According to a recent poll, 53% of
Democrats, 82% of Republicans, and 72% of independents have
negative opinions of the country’s moral principles.134 Merely four
decades ago, only one third of Americans felt that the nation’s morals
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were poor.135 The decline of morality in America can be attributed to
a number of reasons: alcohol and drugs; divorce; government
dependency; greed; lack of religion; selfishness; and the internet,
television, and other media; among other things.136 Regardless of
whether (or why) moral decay is actually occurring in America,
many people perceive this as being the case.137
In her show, Judge Judy directly addresses the crumbling of
morality in America.138 Judge Judy’s mission to cure America’s
moral decay dates back to her tenure as a family court judge. 139 In
1982, New York City Mayor Ed Koch appointed her to Manhattan’s
family court.140 On the bench, she heard over 20,000 cases involving
juvenile adoption, child neglect and abuse, child support, custody,
delinquents, domestic violence, guardianship, paternity, termination
of paternal rights, and visitation.141 From this experience, Judge Judy
believes that America’s moral decay derives from lack of honesty
and responsibility and, notably, “the myopia of a media that, despite
its vast power to do good, is too often asleep at the switch.”142
Taking things into her own hands, Judge Judy’s rulings,
actions, and words on her daytime television show illustrate an
overarching theme of personal responsibility.143 Judge Judy
highlights the basis of this theme in her memoir: “By shifting the
emphasis from individual responsibility to government
responsibility,” she says, “we have infantilized an entire
population.”144 Thus, pandering to the broader television and cultural
audience, Judge Judy addresses her concerns by broadcasting moral
judgments rather than merely punishing irresponsible litigants.145 To
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that end, like colonial officials who used shaming sanctions to
heighten the social disapproval of criminal offenses in a highly
socialized colonial America, Judge Judy uses her daytime television
show as a bullhorn to speak directly to an equally socialized modern
American about the moral discrepancies of its citizens.146
IV.CONCLUSION
In recent years, syndi-court programs such as Judge Judy
have become increasingly popular.147 This article makes three key
observations with respect to syndi-courts.148 First, in general, a
pluralistic perspective offers syndi-courts notions of formalistic
legitimacy inherent to official courts, even though syndi-courts are
private, unofficial means of adjudicating disputes.149 Second, syndicourt judges like Judge Judy use public humiliation when dealing
with foolish parties; however, unlike in the colonial era, when
magistrates would publicly humiliate criminal offenders, public
humiliation in syndi-courts does not trigger heightened feelings of
shame today.150 Finally, although public humiliation in syndi-courts
does not significantly impact individual litigants, syndi-court judges
may use public humiliation to address societal immorality by
pandering to a larger audience via television.151 Overall, the
American legal community should embrace syndi-courts for offering
society a public platform for accountability, honesty, and personal
responsibility.
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